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The purpose of this article is to investigate epistemic conditions for a sequential equilib-
rium in an extensive form game with imperfect information: If players mutually know
that all players maximize their own expected payoﬀs at any information sets in their ﬁnal
decisions then their behaviors with belief yield a sequential equilibrium. This result is an
extension of Aumann (1995, Games and Economic Behavior, 8:6-19) in a perfect infor-
mation game. In this article, we propose the notion of µ-rationality, by which we mean
that player knows that he maximizes his own payoﬀ according to the common-belief µ.
Furthermore we introduce the notion of µ-consistency in imperfect information game.
Our main theorem states that mutual knowledge of both µ-rationality and µ-consistency
induces a sequential equilibrium outcome in an extensive form game.
Keywords: Knowledge, Rationality, Epistemic conditions, Backward induction, Sequen-
tial equilibrium.
1. Introduction
This paper investigates what epistemic conditions induce a sequential equilibrium,
that is, what each player should know in order to achieve the sequential equilibrium
in a given game. There are many equilibrium solutions in an extensive form game,
however it is not clear how players achieve these solutions. This paper aims to
ﬁll this gap for sequential equilibrium in an extensive form game with imperfect
information.
In a normal form game, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) gives epistemic
∗The early version “Knowledge, Rationality, and Sequential Equilibria” was presented at the Eco-
nomic Theory Workshop of Hitotsubashi University in July 2001 and at the annual meeting of
the Japanese Economic Association, Hitotsubashi University in October 2001. An abstract of this
paper was presented in the R.I.M.S. Symposium of ‘Mathematical Economics,’ Kyoto University,
Kyoto (Japan), December 7-9, 2001.
†Partially supported by the Grand-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research(C)(2)(No.12640145) in the Japan
Society for the Promotion of Sciences.
1conditions for leading to Nash equilibrium: Suppose that the players have a common
prior, that their payoﬀ functions and their rationality are mutually known, and
that their conjectures for the opponents’ actions are commonly known. Then the
conjectures form Nash equilibrium.
In an extensive form game there is a contradictory relationship between play-
ers’ rationality and solution concepts. The contradiction is informally presented by
Rosenthal (1981) and is formally investigated by Reny (1992) and Ben-Porath (1997).
They show that players’ rationality at the root in the extensive form game does not
always lead to the backward induction outcome by examining the centipede game.
On the other hand Aumann (1995) establishes the theorem that players’ ra-
tionality at every node in a perfect information game can lead to the backward
induction outcome.
In this paper we investigate in the same line of Aumann. We extend his result
into in an imperfect information game as follows:
Main Theorem. The mutual knowledge of µ-rationality in players’ ﬁnal decisions
leads to a sequential equilibrium of an extensive form game with imperfect informa-
tion.
Precisely, if everybody knows that each maximizes his own expected payoﬀ accord-
ing to the common belief µ at each information set in their ﬁnal decisions, then the
assignment associated with µ induces a sequential equilibrium.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we recall an extensive form game
and the sequential equilibrium based on Kreps and Wilson (1982). In addition, we
introduce knowledge of players and µ-rationality. In section 3 we formally state the
main theorem and give examples to illustrate it. In section 4 we give the proof of
the main theorem, and in the ﬁnal section we conclude some remarks.
2. Game and Knowledge
2.1. Extensive form Games
We consider a ﬁnite extensive form game. By this we mean a structure G =  (T,≺
2),N,(Ii)i∈N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N  consisting of as follows: T is the ﬁnite set of nodes
that is divided into the set of players’ decision nodes X and the set of the terminal
nodes Z. We assume there is no chance moves for simplicity.a (T,≺) forms a tree
with the unique root: The relation ≺ is a totally order on the predecessors P(x)
of each member x in T and p(x) is the immediate predecessor of x. N is a set of
ﬁnitely many players. For each i ∈ N, Xi is the subset of X that consists of i’s
decision nodes and thus X is the disjoint union of all the sets of Xi for i ∈ N.W e
denote by ι(x) the player making his decision at x ∈ X.
The information that player i possesses is represented by i’s information parti-
tion Ii on Xi consisting of components Ii called i’s information set. When a set
Ii ∈I i contains a node x ∈ Xi, we denote it by Ii(x) (or simply by I(x).) Each
information set is identiﬁed with the set of all the decision nodes among which the
player can not distinguish. In addition I denotes the disjoint union of all Ii for
i ∈ N.
Each player i has a feasible action set Ai(I) at every I ∈I i. Since each of
i’s information sets is the set of nodes that she can not distinguish, the feasible
action sets Ai(x), Ai(x )a tx, x  ∈ I are identiﬁed with each other, which denotes
Ai(I). We denote by Ai the set of all proﬁles of i’s feasible-actions; that is, Ai ≡
×I∈IiAi(I).
In this paper we focus on games with perfect recall.b An extensive form game
G is said to be with perfect recall if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
• For any two nodes in a same information set, it is impossible that one node
is the predecessor of the other one.
• For any three nodes x,x ,x    ∈ Xi with x  ∈ I(x  ) and x ∈ P(x ), there exist
ˆ x ∈ I(x) ∩ P(x  ) and a ∈ Ai(I(x)) such that if a respectively reaches x  and
x   then it is played at both x and ˆ x.
The assumption of perfect recall plays a crucial role in the main theorem. Let
ui : Z → R be i’s payoﬀ function on the terminal nodes of T.
aWe restrict our attention into the case that the number of the initial node is just one for simplicity.
bKuhn (1953).
3A local strategy at I ∈I i for player i is a probability distribution bI
i on Ai(I), and
i’s behavior strategy bi is the proﬁle (bI
i)I∈Ii. A behavior strategy bi is called i’s pure
strategy if each component of bi assigns the probability one to the speciﬁc action of
Ai(I) at each information set I. Let Bi(I) denote the set of all local strategies at I
and Bi the set of all behavior strategies for player i. We set B = ×i∈NBi the set of
all proﬁles of behavior strategies.
Each strategy b ∈Binduces the probability distribution P
b on T deﬁned as






where π(x) is the set of all actions reaching x from the root. The formula (2.1)
represents the probability to reach x from the root calculated by the strategies on






By Kuhn’s theorem in Kuhn (1953) we restrict our attention to behavior strate-
gies; hereafter behavior strategies are simply called strategies in this paper.
2.2. Sequential Equilibriumc
A system of beliefs is the class of probability distributions µ on each information
set I ∈I ; hence
 
x∈I µ(x) = 1 for each I ∈I . Let µ(x) interpret as a belief
assigned by ι(x)t ox ∈ I if an information set I is reached. Let M denote the set
of beliefs. Each member of B×Mis called an assessment. Given an assessment
(b,µ) ∈B×M , we deﬁne the conditional probability P










b(a)i f x ∈ P(z) ∩ I,
(2.3)
where π(x,z) is the set of actions taken to reach z from x ∈ I. This formula
represents the probability of player’s assessment of reaching each terminal node
cKreps and Wilson (1982).
4when she is at an information set I. Then we deﬁne the conditional expectation U
µ
i
under i’s information set I by
U
µ





Let B+ denote the set of strategies b ∈Bsuch that b(a)  0 for any a ∈ A, and
M+ the subset of M which consists of µ ∈Msuch that µ(x)  0 at each x ∈ X.








We can now deﬁne the sequential equilibria of G as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let G be an extensive form game. We denote by SE(G| I) the set
of all the assessments (b∗,µ ∗) satisfying both the conditions (CI) and (SRI)a ta n
information set I:
(CI) An assessment (b∗,µ ∗)i sconsistent at the information set I. That is, there




(bn(a),µ(x| bn)) = (b∗(a),µ ∗(x)).
(SRI) An assessment (b∗,µ ∗)i ssequential rational at the information set I. That












where i = ι(I) and b∗
−i =( b∗
j)j∈N\{i}.
Let SE(G) denote the intersection of SE(G|I) over I ∈I . We call (b∗,µ ∗) ∈SE (G)
a sequential equilibrium of the game G.
2.3. Knowledge Structure on G
5Aumann (1995) introduces the partition model of knowledge on extensive form
games. He shows that the backward induction outcome is reached by the common
knowledge of rationality in perfect information games. We will extend the model of
knowledge on perfect information games into that on imperfect information games.
A knowledge structure on an extensive form game G is a quadruple
 Ω,(Πi)i∈N,(Ki)i∈N,b 
consisting of the following structures and interpretations: Ω is a non-empty set,
each element ω is called a state, a subset E of Ω an event, and Πi is a mapping
of Ω into 2Ω such that the image makes a partition on Ω consisting of components
Πi(ω) for ω ∈ Ω. To avoid confusion we call Πi i’s knowledge partition. Intuitively
a component Πi(ω)o fi’s knowledge partition is interpreted as the event consisting
of all the states that player i cannot distinguish from ω. i’s knowledge operator Ki
on 2Ω is deﬁned by
KiE = {ω ∈ Ω| Πi(ω)  E} for E  Ω. (2.6)
A mapping b from Ω to B assigns a |N|-tuple (bi(ω))i∈N of players’ strategies to
each ω ∈ Ω.
We record the properties of the knowledge operator:d For any E,F  Ω,
(N) KiΩ=Ω ;
(M) If E  F, then KiE  KiF;
(K) Ki(E ∩ F)=KiE ∩ KiF;
(T) KiE  E;
(4) KiE  Ki(KiE);
(5) Ω \ KiE  Ki(Ω \ KiE).
dBacharach (1985).
6The mutual knowledge operator KE on Ω is deﬁned by KEF =
 
i∈N KiF.
The event KEF is interpreted as that ‘every player knows F.’ An event F is called
publically known among the players if F  KEF. The common-knowledge operator







The event KCE is interpreted as that ‘all players know that all players know that
··· that all players knows E.’
Now, if φ is a function on Ω and v is its value then [φ = v] (or simply [v])
denotes the event {ω ∈ Ω| φ(ω)=v}. Therefore for any bi ∈B i, we denote by [bi]
the set {ω ∈ Ω | bi(ω)=bi}. We assume that every behavior strategy is publically
known among the players; that is,
(PK) [bi]  KE[bi] for every bi ∈B i.
This is interpreted as that everybody knows every behavior strategy for each player.
In view of the assumption (PK) we can observe that each strategies of player i is
Πi-measurable, and thus Ki[bi]=[ bi]b y( T).
Example 1. Let G be an extensive form game  (T,≺),N,(Ii)i∈N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N .





Ii(ω)i f ω ∈ Xi
Ω \ Xi otherwise.
(2.7)
Let bI
i :Ω→B i(I) be deﬁned as follows: We let take a ∈ Ai(I) and bi ∈B i(I) for






bi(a)i f ω ∈ I ∈I i
0 otherwise.
(2.8)
We set bi =( bI
i)I∈Ii as the proﬁle of bI
i over i’s information sets, and set the
mapping b on Ω into B by b =( bi)i∈N. Let us deﬁne the knowledge operator Kj







I if i = j
∅ if i  = j,
(2.9)
for any bI
i ∈B i(I). Then for any bi ∈B i and bI
i ∈B i(I), it can be observed that
[bi]= I∈Ii[bI
i]  ∪KE[bI
i]= I∈IiI by (M), where the symbol   denotes the
disjoint union operator.
2.4. Rationality and Consistency
We introduce the notion of rationality which is an extension of rationality in Au-
mann (1995). Let µ be a system of beliefs. An player i is said to be µ-rational at
I ∈I i if each strategy that i does not know never yields his expected utility value
according to µ at I ∈I i greater than the actual expected utility value at I.I fh ei s




















where ∼ denotes the complementation and b−i denotes (bj)j∈N\{i}. This is inter-















The former event is interpreted as that player i is µ-rational and the latter as that all
players are µ-rational. Furthermore we deﬁne the notion of µ-consistency. For given
µ ∈M , the event of µ-consistency Cµ is the set of all the states ω such that there




It is well end this section in a remark: Rationality in perfect information game is
clearly equivalent to µ-rationality when the belief µ is the constant function 1. That
is, the rationality in Aumann (1995) is the 1-rationality R1 for all players in our
sense. One of the purposes in this paper is to extend the result of Aumann (1995)
in the case of µ-rationality.
83. The Result
Let G be an extensive form game and µ ∈M . We denote by SEµ(G) the event con-
sisting of the states ω ∈ Ω such that the assessment (b(ω),µ) ∈B×Mconstitutes
a sequential equilibriums in G; that is,
SEµ(G)={ω ∈ Ω | (b(ω),µ) ∈SE(G) }.
Furthermore, SEµ(G| I) denotes the event consisting of the states ω ∈ Ω such that
(b(ω),µ)i sam e m b e ro fSE(G| I) for each information set I.
We denote by IF the subset of I consisting of all the information sets in which
each player ﬁnally decides in the game G.B yﬁnal decisions of player i we mean
the set of all the nodes in his information sets where he can reach some terminal
node without any other his decisions. Let R
µ






The main theorem states that if µ-rationality at the information sets in ﬁnal
decisions for each players under µ-consistency for some µ ∈Mis mutually known
then the sequential equilibrium is achieved in the given game G. We can now state





Before proceeding with the proof we shall give two examples to illustrate the
theorem.
Example 2. The ﬁrst example is an extensive game with perfect information. N is
{1,2}. First player 1 chooses either L or R as his action, and player 2 chooses a pair
of a,b,c,d contingently. The backward induction strategy is uniquely determined:
the player 1’s is R and the player 2’s is (b,d). Figure 1 shows this situation.













Figure 1: Case of Perfect Information
follows: Ω is the set of all action proﬁles:
Ω=

      






      
      
;
the knowledge partition Πi for i ∈ N is deﬁned by Πi(ω)={ω} for every ω ∈ Ω;
the knowledge operator Ki is given by (2.6); and ﬁnally the map b :Ω→Bis the
identity map. It is easily seen that SE1(G)={(R,(b,d))} because the sequential
equilibrium implies the backward induction strategy, and it can be also observed
that R1 ∩ C1 = {(R,(b,d))}. Therefore KE(R1 ∩ C1)=SE1(G).
Example 3. The next example is an extensive game with imperfect information.
N is {1,2}. First player 1 chooses either L or R and player 2 chooses either a or b.
The sequential equilibrium uniquely determined: the player 1’s is R and the player
2’s is b when µ(R) = 1. Figure 3 shows this situation.
Now let  Ω,(Πi)i∈N,(Ki)i∈N,b  be the knowledge structure on G consisting
of as follows: Ω is the set of all behavior strategies on A; that is, Ω = B. The
knowledge partition Πi for player i ∈ N is deﬁned by Πi(ω)={ω}; the knowledge













Figure 2: Case of Imperfect Information
It is easily seen that SEµ(G)={(R,b)} with µ(R) = 1 and it can be also observed
that Rµ ∩ Cµ = {R,b}. Therefore KE(Rµ ∩ Cµ)=SEµ(G).
4. Proof of Theorem
On noting the assumption (PK) it can be plainly observed that SEµ(G) 
KE(R
µ
F ∩ Cµ). The converse will be shown by induction as follows. It may be
assumed that KE(R
µ
F ∩ Cµ)  = ∅. For each information set I ∈I i, let Si(I) be the
subset of Ii consisting of i’s information sets next after i decides at I. Let I≺(I)
denote the set of all the information sets at which ι(I) decides after I. We shall
show the two points: First that for each i ∈ N and any h ∈I F ∩Ii, Ki(R
µ
F ∩Cµ) 
SEµ(G| h), and secondly that Ki(R
µ
F ∩ Cµ)  SEµ(G| I)i fKi(R
µ
F ∩ Cµ) 
SEµ(G| h)a ta n yh ∈I ≺(I).




















We note that for any ω ∈ KE(R
µ





















⇔∃ ξ ∈ Πi(ω),U
µ




11Furthermore, it is observed that bi(ω)=bi(ξ) for any ξ ∈ Πi(ω)b y( PK), and thus
it can be plainly obtained that for any ω ∈ KE(R
µ









Therefore we have shown that for each ω ∈ Ki(R
µ
F ∩ Cµ), the assessment (b(ω),µ)
is µ-rational on any h ∈I F ∩I i, and it is easily observed that the assessment is
µ-consistent. It follows that Ki(R
µ
F ∩ Cµ)  SEµ(G| h).
The following lemma is needed to verify the second point. For I ∈I i let Si(I)
be the set of all nodes x in Xi such that there is a node y in I ∩ P(x) with the
property: If z ∈ Xi∩P(x) with y ≺ z ≺ x then z = y. We denote P(x| b): =P
b(x)
for simplicity.







˜ x∈h P(˜ x| b)
 








˜ x∈h P(˜ x| bn) µ(x | bn)
 




Therefore it follows that
U
µ













˜ x∈h P(˜ x| bn)
 










˜ x∈h P(˜ x| bn)
 











˜ x∈h P(˜ x| b)
 




in completing the proof of the lemma. 
Let us return to the proof of theorem, and we shall verify the second point.
Assume now that Ki(R
µ
F ∩ Cµ)  SEµ(G| h) for each i ∈ N and each information
12set h ∈I i with h  Si(I). We shall show that Ki(R
µ
F ∩Cµ)  SEµ(G| I). Suppose





i (˜ bi,b−i(ω)| I)  U
µ
i (b(ω)| I). (4.11)
It suﬃces to prove that for any ¯ bi ∈B i
U
µ
i (b(ω)| I)  U
µ
i (¯ bi,b−i(ω)| I). (4.12)
In fact, it can be easily observed that the inequality (4.12) is in contradiction to
(4.11), completing the proof of the theorem.








˜ x∈h P(˜ x| b(ω))
 








˜ x∈h P(˜ x| b(ω))
 






˜ x∈h P(˜ x| b(ω))
 
ˆ x∈I P(ˆ x| b(ω))
U
µ







˜ x∈h P(˜ x| bn)
 









˜ x∈h P(x | bn)
 












i (¯ bi,b−i(ω)| I).
This completes the proof of the inequality (4.12) and so does the proof of the
theorem.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper examines what epistemic conditions about players’ rationality lead to the
outcomes induced by a sequential equilibrium. Aumann (1995) shows that if players
act on the rational behavior in a perfect information game then they can obtain the
outcome by the backward induction solution. In this paper we extend this result
into the case for sequential equilibrium. We require here only the mutual knowledge
of rationality for all players instead of common knowledge of it in Aumann (1995).
13Therefore it is suﬃcient only to know rationality at the information sets in ﬁnal
decisions for each player.
Some related works (e.g. Reny (1992), Ben-Porath (1997)) lead to the diﬀerent
results from Aumann’s. In Aumann (1995) and this paper rationality on informa-
tion sets is required, however they do only beliefs about players’ rationality at the
beginning of a game. Since players have the Bayesian rationality in Reny (1992),
Ben-Porath (1997) players can revise their own beliefs about their opponents’ be-
haviors or their present nodes through moving plays. These are the diﬀerent views
in examining extensive form games. Aumann regards rationality of players as an
representation of the equilibrium, while Reny and Ben-Porath capture it as playa-
bility in a given game. We would like to examine the relationship between the two
views in the further research.
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